Uganda and their first head of state, Milton Obote.

On the eve of independence from the British in 1962, Uganda’s future looked bright. While the neighboring countries of Kenya and Tanzania resorted to bloody insurrections to secure their freedom, Uganda simply watched as the British organized a peaceful withdrawal, leaving the country’s nascent infrastructure intact. As the new Ugandan government formed to fill the British void, divisive nationalism among the many ethnic groups did not surface. And white settlers did not lay claim to Uganda’s bountiful agricultural lands or rich minerals, but quietly stepped aside while the educated Uganda middle and upper classes took over. Uganda appeared poised to avoid the bloody disruption that marked so many other African countries transitioning to democracy. But the peace and stability was short lived. Uganda belatedly acquired the same vices that characterized other transitioning African democracies: a lust for power and the use of corruption to maintain that power. For Uganda, the road to decline began with their first head of state, Milton Obote.

Shortly after independence, a constitution was developed placing Obote at the head of a national government comprised of several political parties. Unlike other African countries, the political parties grouped according to regional interests rather than ethnic loyalties. To keep the parties content, Obote granted them special concessions, such as choice development projects, in exchange for their patronage. Obote took steps to please a variety of parties and antagonism over favoritism was not wide spread. However, Obote’s system had its limits. The differences between the northern and southern regions of the country were diverse, and could not be ignored. The two regions spoke radically different languages. The northern pastoralists felt overshadowed by the southern agriculturists. The Christians – once preferred by the British authorities – now chaffed under the increasing influence of the Muslims.
 
The growing tensions might have been assuaged if it weren’t for an untimely military uprising in 1964. Demanding promotions and higher pay, the military attempted a coup d’etat that was only averted with the aid of British troops. Although the British saved the Obote government, the coup d’etat demonstrated the military’s might, and Obote eventually granted them their demands in exchange for their constant support. With the military on his side, Obote found less reason to make concessions among legislatures, and began to tighten his control over the country. His imprecise system of patronage was abandoned, and threats of military force silenced his opposition.

The military’s loyalty was comforting to Obote, and he chose a low-ranking soldier to groom as his protégé. The illiterate Idi Amin quickly accelerated to take command of the military. The position was rewarding. Amin led troops on secret missions into the Congo to fight with the rebels, and was paid with looted ivory and gold. Amin flaunted his power, however, and in 1966 when he tried to deposit the looted Congolese gold in his bank account, lawmakers and opposition parties charged the regime with corruption. Obote didn’t bother to respond and considered himself secure with his protégé at the head of the military. When Obote was on an official visit to northern Uganda, the government issued a vote of no confidence against him, legally ending his presidential term. But Obote was not content to lose his regime so easily. Calling upon Amin, he asked the soldier to perform a coup d’etat against his own government, with the result of placing Obote firmly in power. The coup worked. Obote dissolved his government, illegally passed a new constitution, and instituted marital law to combat any resistance.

Within a few years, however, Obote was not feeling quite so secure in his new role. Failed attempts on his life made him have doubts about those he trusted to protect him. Despite his omnipotence in his new government, Obote was painfully aware that he owed his power exclusively to Amin and the military. Obote was also aware that Amin had been steadily recruiting new soldiers from the region of his birth in Uganda. Obote, however, hailed from an opposing Ugandan region. To counterbalance Amin’s growing power, Obote formed an elite gendarme populated with loyal supporters from his home region. In 1970, he checked Amin’s power by placing him under house arrest for alleged budget infractions. It was during a diplomatic mission abroad, that Obote gave the final orders to have Amin and his troops arrested. But word leaked to Amin, and he advanced quickly, seizing the capital. All Obote supporters were executed, marital law was invoked for the entire country, and Obote had no choice but to flee into exile in Tanzania.

From his new home, Obote watched as his country plunged into further chaos. Amin ruled the country with an iron fist, stamping out resistance with bloody executions and torture. His soldiers ran large swaths of the Ugandan countryside like warlords in their own personal fiefdoms. Homes were sacked, business ruined through extortion, families destroyed on suspicion of disloyalty. Amin was also obsessed with the idea that Obote would try to regain his hold on power with the help of Tanzanian leader, Julius Nyerere. A border scuffle between the two countries led to war, and Tanzanian troops fought to the Ugandan capital of Kampala where Amin was forced to flee into permanent exile in Saudi Arabia.

Obote waited as the stage was set for his return. In 1979, an interim government was established to reverse the damage of several years of war and corruption. The Ugandan National Liberation Front, however, was plagued by rivalries and wholly ineffective. As the UNLF leaders bickered over policy, soldiers continued to consolidate in the field. These soldiers, one group led by a Colonel Museveni, had broken from Amin’s rank and had aided the Tanzanian forces in his expulsion. Although Amin had since gone, they were still wary of the new UNLF. When the UNLF demanded that Museveni’s army recruiting be curbed, they were met with a coup d’etat in 1980. Easily the UNLF toppled, and Obote triumphantly returned to govern Uganda.

In December 1980, Uganda held its first democratic elections in eighteen years, but the voters did not overwhelmingly choose Obote as expected. When the rival Democratic Party was declared the victor, Obote’s loyal troops ‘recounted’ the votes in Obote’s favor. Obote became the President of Uganda and resumed his corrupt patronage system, giving less consideration to rebuilding his war-torn country. The strong-arm tactics of Obote, however, did not please Colonel Museveni, and he immediately declared his troops to be the National Resistance Army fighting for the common people and fair elections. Museveni’s guerrilla troops dogged Obote’s men persistently throughout Obote’s presidency. Museveni’s cause was popular among the Ugandans and he readily recruited from areas increasingly hostile to Obote. Obote’s efforts to eradicate Museveni increased. He forcefully evacuated several thousand families from regions traditionally unfavorable to him, and from where he suspected Museveni was recruiting. Obote even flirted with the idea of accepting military aid from the North Koreans. But insecurities about the loyalty of his troops again afflicted Obote. As though repeating his own life history, Obote ordered the arrest of his top military advisers while he was touring neighboring countries. Again, the military was the first to strike. They seized the capital, and Obote fled permanently to Tanzania with much of the Uganda treasury.

Combined with the instability unleashed by independence, Obote’s vices of control and corruption set the precedent for Uganda’s fall from grace. Obote’s actions sparked the bloody regime of Amin and the ineffective vacillating of the UNLF, yet he returned to power with no more clarity than he possessed during his first regime. The damage caused by Obote and successive regimes and political parties is what prompted the current Ugandan president, Colonel Museveni, in 1986 to prohibit parties from advancing candidates for president. According to Museveni, candidates must run on their own merits and be beholden to no one to lead the country. It is with this vision that for over ten years Museveni has tried to repair the damage. Critics have charged him with totalitarianism in a democratic country, but Museveni has claimed that he is implementing a new African style of government. Problems still plague the country, such as refugees from neighboring Congo, ebola breakouts, and AIDS. If Museveni’s African model of g
overnment can effectively deal with these issues remains to be seen. In 2002, the country will hold its next elections. Its outcome will determine the future of this country, and whether or not it has slipped back into its old Obote-style corruption, or if it is truly poised once again to be a leader for Africa.